최대주주지분율과 주가동조성

초록

This study analyzes the impact of the ownership of the largest shareholders on information transparency. According to the existing literature, the wealth of the largest shareholder is determined by the sum of the monetary value arising from the stock holdings and the monetary and non-monetary value that can be obtained from the pursuit of private benefits. If the contradicting incentives of maximizing corporate value and pursuing private profits depend on the degree of the largest shareholder’s ownership, the level of information transparency can also change according to the level of ownership. Accordingly, in this paper, we analyze whether there is a nonlinear relation between the largest shareholder's ownership and the stock price synchronicity which measures the level of information transparency. If the ownership of the largest shareholders is below a certain level, the stock price synchronicity increases depending on the ownership of the largest shareholders. On the other hand, when the ownership of the largest shareholders exceeds a certain level, the stock price synchronicity decreases according to the ownership of the largest shareholders. This is interpreted as trying to hide firm-specific information because the utility of pursuing private profits is greater than the value obtained from the stock holdings when the ownership of the largest shareholders is relatively low. Conversely, if the largest shareholder's ownership is high, they may prefer maximizing welfare through increasing the value of equity capital rather than pursuing private interests, and it is interpreted as more actively disclosing firm-specific information according to these incentives.

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