조세회피와 소유구조

초록

In this paper we examine the association between tax avoidance and ownership structure. It depends on the incentives of compositions of ownership structure. Separation of ownership and control addresses agency problems between managers and shareholders. Ownership structure is one potential mechanism to explain these agency problems. We separate ownership structure into three components. We hypothesize that, controlling holdings not to connect with tax avoidance and as institution and foreign investor holdings increase, the severity of agency problem decreases,decreasing the demand of tax avoidance. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that tax avoidance as measured by CASH ETR, GAAP ETR, Adj CASH, Adj GAAP, DD_BTD, and TSE declines with institution and foreign investors holdings, however, controlling holdings has significant association with tax avoidance. The negative association between tax avoidance and foreign investors holdings is robust to various tax avoidance measure and controls, in particular. The negative association with controlling holders and institutions holdings depends on the tax avoidance measures and analysis of level and change . Foreign investors can improve the transparency of firm, so it reduce the agency problem, in particular. We thus provide evidence of a various association between tax avoidance and components of ownership structure. This study improve the research methodology and reduce measurement error of tax avoidance compared to the prior study.

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