한국 기업의 자본조달과 마켓타이밍에 관한 연구: 지배주주 지분율을 중심으로

초록

This paper examines market timing in equity issuance of the listed companies controlled by large shareholders in Korea between 1993 and 2011. The controlling shareholders have incentives to issue the shares when the stock price is overvalued, since the overall value of the controlling shareholders increases. However, this argument is particularly true in cases of equity issuance with dilution of the controlling shareholder. In this paper, we examine return predictability after equity issuance based on the ownership of the controlling shareholders. We find that returns following issuances are poor, which supports market timing theory, only when the controlling shareholder’s stake is reduced. We argue that it is another form of opportunistic behavior by controlling shareholders in Korea. In addition, we find an increase of market timing behavior of the controlling shareholders when the firm has severe information asymmetry and there is the irrationality of investors. Finally, taking into account the corporate governance, we also find an increase of opportunistic behavior of the controlling shareholders when the firm has weak corporate governance.

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