가격에 의한 품질 시그널링: 두 유형의 소비자가 있는 시장을 중심으로

초록

I analyze the market with two groups of consumers differentiated by the sensitivity to product quality, who have imperfect information about product quality and purchase a product repeatedly. I find there are two different types of price signaling equilibrium depending on the first-period price. That is, the firm can sell to either both types of consumers by charging a low price(low price signaling equilibrium: LPSE) or consumers who are more sensitive to product quality only by charging a high price(high price signaling equilibrium: HPSE). LPSE always exist unless the value which consumers with a lower sensitivity put on the product is not too low. HPSE exists when the ratio of the number of consumers with a lower sensitivity to that with a higher sensitivity is greater than 1, but not too high. When both LPSE and HPSE exist, HPSE(LPSE) occurs when the ratio of the number of consumers is low(high). I also find that over two periods price may increase or decrease depending on the value and number of consumers.

키워드