소유구조가 스톡옵션행사와 이익조정 간의 관계에 미치는 효과

초록

Stock option plans have been perceived as an useful devise to enhance the value of a firm as well as to induce managerial decision-makings in a long-term perspective. However, due to the connection between stock option plans and a stock price in the market, stock options have long been criticized for the likelihood to be used as a managerial device of opportunism. In fact, it didn't emphasized that stock option plans were useless, then again, it implied that advanced discussions about managerial incentives related to stock option plans were needed. In this context, this paper investigated whether the equity portions of largest shareholders and foreign investors affected the relationship between stock option exercises and earnings management. As a result, we could find the positive effects of largest shareholders on the relationship between stock option exercises and earnings management. The results also showed that the interaction term of foreign investors and stock option exercise was not statistically significant. Furthermore, the test based on the distinction between owner-manager firms and CEO-manager firms showed that earnings management related to stock option exercises are more apparent in CEO-manager firms. It also showed that the effects of ownership variables for largest shareholders on the relationship between stock option exercises and earnings management were more apparent in CEO-manager firms. As for the issue on earnings management for stock option exercise, largest shareholders are likely to infringe minority shareholders' interests rather than to monitor and control the opportunistic behaviors of management. This study suggested that the ownership structures focusing on largest shareholders were important considerations in stock option plans by confirming empirically the effects of ownership structure on the managerial incentives of earnings management associated with stock option exercises.

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