코스닥 상장기업의 지배구조와 대리인 비용

초록

This study analyzed the relationship between governance structure and agency cost in the 718 non-financial, KOSDAQ-listed companies during the period from 2001 to 2010. Statistical analysis using fixed effect model of unbalanced panel data generally supports our arguments. This paper used two different proxies for agency cost: the turnover ratio of assets and the ratio of SG&A costs. Also, insider ownership ratio, board size, institutional investors’ ratio, and foreign investors’ ratio are included in a model as independent variables. The statistical results are as follows. As the insider ownership increases, the turnover ratio of assets increases while the ratio of SG&A costs decreases. Also, the board size is positively associated with the turnover ratio of assets. These results suggest that convergence of interest hypothesis is supported for KOSDAQ-listed companies: it is the same as in case of stock market listed companies. In addition, the positive impact of the board size implies that the large size of the boards of KOSDAQ-listed companies may be effective in controlling agency problems between top managers and shareholders unlike the boards of stock market listed companies.

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