지원(propping)의심기업들의 특수관계자 거래를 통한 이익하향조정

Downward Earnings Management through Related Party Transactions in Propping Firms

초록

The purpose of this study is to testify that a related party transaction has a negative relation to discretionary accruals in the case of the firms performing the propping that transfer their resources to their affiliates and people with a special relationship. When dominant firms do propping to their affiliates, they generally hold stable profit and abundant cash flow and have an incentive to reduce their earnings for, at least, tax costs. Thus, the dominant firms propping their affiliates could have an incentive to downward earnings management through the related party transactions. The results of this study are as following. Firms in the highest possibility of propping, first, have the lower negative discretionary accruals than other firms. However, the extent of doing downward earnings management is not significantly different between propping firms and other firms that showed a negative relation between related party transaction and discretionary accruals. Additional test is performed on the sample K-GAAP, because disclosure method is changed from notes of in K-GAAP to being capable to choose either notes or statement of financial position in K-IFRS. Similar to the full sample, the result appeared that propping firms have the lower negative discretionary accruals and show a negative relation between related party transaction and discretionary accruals. This study contributes to accounting literatures in both earnings management and related party transaction by providing the evidence that related party transactions in dominant firms are used for earnings management downwards with classification of tunneling and propping.

키워드

downward earnings managementproppingrelated party transactions이익하향조정propping특수관계자 거래
제목
지원(propping)의심기업들의 특수관계자 거래를 통한 이익하향조정
제목 (타언어)
Downward Earnings Management through Related Party Transactions in Propping Firms
저자
신호영홍사선오상훈
발행일
2013-08
저널명
경영교육연구
28
4
페이지
407 ~ 432